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ABSTRACT 
Much of the violence in Eurasia since the break-up of the Soviet Union has been 
blamed purely on radical Islamic fundamentalism. This characterization is at best 
simplistic and at worst dangerously insufficient. Not understanding the underlying 
causes of violence in this volatile region will marginalize the efforts of both American 
diplomats and soldiers to help to prevent future political violence through engagement 
agendas and in their failure to do so execute post-conflict operations. 
It is widely accepted that the potential for political violence across Eurasia is high. 
Given the complicated array of human divisions and mobilizing institutions that exist 
there, lessons learned from past or present conflicts might be insufficient to craft 
meaningful engagement and post-conflict strategies. 
This thesis attempts to provide a framework to better understand the complex 
socio-political underpinnings of society. It will attempt to dispel the popular notion that 
the preponderance of regional violence is purely predicated on Islamic fanaticism and 
postulate that the true causes are instead, more rational and political. It will emphasize 
the divides and allegiances at the local levels where policymakers will influence 
populations and soldiers and humanitarians will assist in the rebuilding of broken 
institutions and infrastructure in the aftermath of political violence. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
Professor Samuel Huntington posits in his seminal work The Clash 
of Civilizations, that the biggest threat to world stability after the fall of 
the Soviet Union continues to be bipolar in nature. He argues that instead 
of the West facing off against the Soviet bloc countries, as evidenced by 
the Cold War, now the primary struggle for survival will pit Western 
civilization against the Eastern civilizations.! His dogmatic views have 
stirred many opposing and supporting views across a wide range of 
disciplines. In his treatise, he warns of the rise of Islam as the greatest 
threat to the West. Many Westerners both in and out of government 
appear to share his views with respect to the threat of Islam. This is 
constantly reinforced by both the media and by governmental information 
appariti. 
There should be no doubt in anyone's mind that radical Islamic 
fundamentalism is indeed a serious threat to states and populations. 
There is certainly sufficient evidence to support the notion that much of 
the world's violence has been carried out in the name of Allah. Ted Gurr 
contends that of fifty ethno-political conflicts in the two-year period 
1 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order, (New York: 
Touchstone, 1996), 8. 
1 
between 1994 and 1995, twenty-six involved Moslem participants.2 
However, this viewpoint must be researched and thoroughly argued before 
any assertion can be made that the "Green Menace" of Islam will replace 
the "Red Menace" of Communism as the primary threat to world peace. 
There is evidence that other more rational motives exist that have 
ignited political violence in Muslim regions. Islam is indeed a superb 
mobilizing force and an effective organizer of disaffected populations, 
rivaled in history perhaps only by socialism. It is important however, to 
be able to distinguish between conflicts genuinely caused by a desire to 
establish an Islamic state under Shari' a law, as opposed to violence 
propagated by politically motivated entrepreneurs using Islam for the sole 
purpose of unifying, mobilizing, and organizing a broader based 
disaffected constituency. 
Religion, and notably, Islam, is arguably the most capable force to 
mobilize a population of Moslems to commit significant political 
violence. However, mobilizing factors such as religion, ethnicity, class, 
or nationalism, are parts of a larger formula equating to large-scale 
organized violence. Ted Gurr and Barbara Harff state that it is a 
mobilizing factor added to an opportunity that yields violence.3 
Opportunists will often make use of religious or even ethnic differences in 
2Jbid., 257. 
3 Ted Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1994), 84. 
2 
populations. Early recognition, and subsequent addressing, of these 
precipitating opportunities should allow diplomats and soldiers to 
formulate more meaningful and lasting strategies to resolve conflicts and 
to better shape post-conflict agendas. 
B. RELEVANCE 
Much of the violence across the Transcaucasus and Central Asia 
since the break-up of the Soviet Union has been blamed on the enormous 
revival of Islam. This characterization is often at best simplistic and at 
worst dangerously insufficient. It is widely accepted that the potential for 
political violence across Eurasia is high, given the complicated array of 
human divisions and mobilizing institutions coupled to an endless stream 
of political and economic opportunities for dissent. Thus, lessons learned 
from past or present conflicts elsewhere in the world may be insufficient 
to craft meaningful engagement and post-conflict strategies. 
Insufficient appreciation of the true underlying causes of violence 
m these volatile regions will marginalize the efforts of diplomats and 
soldiers to help to prevent future political violence through engagement 
agendas and post-conflict operations. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis strives to provide a framework to better understand the. 
complex socio-political underpinnings of those regional societies both 
susceptible to and those societies already engaged in conflict. It will 
3 
attempt to dispel the popular notion that the preponderance of regional 
violence is purely predicated on true Islamic motivations and will instead 
postulate that the true causes are more rational and political. The thesis 
recognizes the immense attraction of Islam as a unifying and mobilizing 
force but will tend to view this aspect as a "tool in the kitbag" of the 
political entrepreneur. It will also emphasize the divides and allegiances 
at the local levels where soldiers and humanitarians will have to work to 
assist in the rebuilding of broken institutions and infrastructure in the 
aftermath of political violence. 
In an effort to better understand the dynamics of this sort of 
conflict, this thesis will explore three case studies of political violence 
during the last decade in Eurasia, namely, the civil war in Tajikistan, the 
ethnic violence in the Ferghana Valley, and the war between Azerbaijan 
and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. 
4 
II. TAJIKISTAN 
A. BACKGROUND 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been a resurgence 
of Islamic movements throughout the former Central Asian Soviet 
republics. The popular view is that the fall of the Soviet empire allowed 
a hitherto repressed Islamism to rise again. Several of these movements 
have turned violent, threatening the political stability both within the 
emergent republics and across the region. This instability also concerns 
those nations bordering the new Central Asian states, most importantly, 
Russia, Pakistan and China. To date the only one of these Central Asian 
states to realize significant turmoil has been Tajikistan, which endured a 
bloody civil war from 1991 to 1996 and exists today in a highly unstable 
security environment. 
But given that the vast majority of people in Central Asia are 
Muslim, why then, as Moscow and Beijing both feared, has no Central 
Asian republic, even Tajikistan, the most suspected, chosen to become an 
Islamic state, perhaps modeled after Iran or Afghanistan? There is some 
suspicion that the majority of the post-independence political violence is 
not primarily motivated by Islamic radicalism. This seems plausible 
given the seventy odd years that Central Asian peoples lived largely 
secular existences under communism. Consequently, it has been asserted 
that these movements really result from the secular political 
entrepreneurship under the guise of Islamic revivalism. 
5 
This chapter asks the following question: In the case of Tajikistan, 
the only Central Asian state to be rent by a full-scale civil war, was the 
popular resurgence of Islam following the fall of the Soviet empue the 
primary causus belli? Or alternatively, is it more likely that the end of 
Soviet rule merely allowed a series of opportunistic political 
entrepreneurs to capitalize on the age old organizing and mobilizing 
principle of religion? 
Even to the careful observer it would seem safe to assume that the 
post-Soviet era political violence is based primarily on a quick and 
dramatic upsurge in radical Islamic fundamentalism. As Muriel Atkin 
surmises: 
"A widely heard characterization of the power struggle there was that it 
was being waged by two diametrically opposed camps: one representing 
secularism and stability and led for much of the period by the president, 
Rahman Nabiev (deposed in September 1992); the other representing 
radical Islamic 'fundamentalism. "'1 
It is commonly asserted that the Soviets completely eradicated 
Islamic practices and devotions in the region during their rule.2 In 
reality, Moscow's anti-religious campaigns in Central Asia were for many 
reasons, largely ineffective. A 1970 Soviet study acknowledged that 77% 
1 Muriel Atkin, The Politics of Polarization in Tajikistan in Central Asia, ed. Hafeez Malik, (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 211. 
2 Haghayeghi Mehrdad, Islam and Politics in Central Asia (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 
37. 
6 
of males and 80% of females in the region openly claimed the Muslim 
faith.3 Of the five pillars of Islam, only one, the Hajj (the pilgrimage to 
Mecca), was effectively denied to the faithful; the authorities only 
permitted about twenty-five "loyal" Tajik party members to make the trip 
each year.4 Although it is true that a large majority of the populace 
considered themselves Muslim, the above cited study also revealed that of 
those claiming to be Muslim, less than half prayed daily, about half fasted 
. during Ramadan, and only eleven percent considered themselves to be 
devout Muslims.s Although these figures indicate a low percentage of 
devout Muslims, Islam within the Soviet Union was certainly not totally 
suppressed, especially in rural areas and at family gatherings. Even in 
1963, during Krushchev's most severe anti-religious campaigns, about 
four hundred mosques still openly operated in the Central Asian Soviets 
and many hundreds more operated more discreetly in homes and village 
halls. 6 
A second widespread misconception involves the character of Islam 
in Central Asia. Those who fear a Huntingtonesque Islamic takeover tend 
3 Ibid., 37. 
4 Muriel Atkin, The Subtlest Battle: Islam in Soviet Tajikistan (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy 
Research Institute, 1989), 14. 
5 Mehrdad, 3 7. 
6 Ibid., 33. 
7 
to approach Islam in Central Asia as a monolithic, uniform phenomenon. 7 
In fact, Islamic practices, doctrine, and influences on regional politics 
vary greatly between each of the new Central Asia republics and within 
each republic itself; this occurs even at the village level. Many of these 
differences can be traced to when a particular area first converted to Islam 
or assumed a Muslim identity, in some regions the difference can be over 
six hundred years. Some areas subscribe to widely divergent branches of 
Islam; for example, about 200,000 of the Tajiks in the mountainous Pamiri 
region are Ismailis of the Shia sect whereas the majority of Tajiks 
elsewhere are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi school. It is obvious that 
differences at the grass roots level must be taken into consideration in 
order to rationalize and develop effective policies for the region. 
A third popular belief is that Moscow firmly suppressed Islamic 
dissent and that the widespread adherence to Islamic practices and Islamic 
political activism is a relatively new phenomenon. This is untrue. Islamic 
violence erupted during the Stalinist purges of the 1930's and again in 
1960-64.8 The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan raised the level of 
anti-government sentiment by Muslims to a new peak; it galvanized the 
Muslim population against the Brezhnev regime.9 Then, in the 1980s, 
7 M. Holt Ruffm and Daniel Waugh, ed., Civil Society in Central Asia, (New York: Center for 
Civil Society International, 1999), 161. 
8 Mehrdad, 38. 
9 Ibid., 39. 
8 
thousands of Soviet Tajiks and Uzbeks joined their Muslim brethren, the 
Afghan Mujahadeen, in their fight against the Soviets. The Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, which ironically sought to preserve communism, 
served to facilitate contact between the Tajiks living in Afghanistan and 
those at home in Tajikistan.10 The unpopular Soviet intervention gave 
new impetus to an Islamic revival that was well under way as many as 
twenty years before the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev's g/asnost.ll 
In actuality, Stalin's exercise of ethno-territorial delimitation 
remains at the root of most of the troubles for the Tajik populations. Of 
all the created republics in Central Asia, Tajikistan is the most artificial 
and least satisfactory.12 
Of the five new Central Asian republics, Tajikistan has undoubtedly 
had the roughest transition to statehood. Since its inception as a Soviet in 
1924 it has been the poorest economically. It has the least arable land, 
the fewest minerals and the worst infrastructure.B Historically, it 
suffered horribly under the Russian Empire and under the Soviets, as 
demonstrated by the removal of its three greatest cultural centers--
10 Graham Fuller, Central Asia: The New Geopolitics, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), 64. 
11 Ruffm and Waugh, 165. 
12 Roland Dannreuther, Creating New States in Central Asia, (London: Brassey's (UK) Ltd., 
1994), 25. 
13 Mohiaddin Meshabi, Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union, (Gainesville: 
University Press ofFlorida, 1994), 68. 
9 
Bukhara, Samarkand, and Kohjent, which Moscow callously and 
carelessly placed inside neighboring Uzbekistan, which they favored 
politically over Tajikistan. This occlusion of their historic cultural 
centers, along with Stalin's ethnic dilution schemes, contributed to what 
many scholars claim is a lack of a clear Tajik national identity. Also 
excluded by Stalin's "state-making" were two-thirds of the ethnic Tajiks 
who found themselves trapped inside Uzbekistan. These two facts are the 
basis for today's inter-ethnic tension between the two countries. 
Additionally, throughout the Stalin and the Khrushchev years, hundreds of 
thousands of ethnic Russians were "encouraged" to emigrate to Tajikistan. 
These Russians held the vast majority of the political and technological 
jobs; they became the social elite of Tajikistan_l4 
This immigration created an ethno-economic hierarchy that, 
confusingly for the masses, contradicted Soviet claims of equality and 
homogeneity. The "native" Soviets were relegated almost exclusively, to 
the lower levels of the social, political, and economic hierarchy. Many, 
in fact, remained little more than mere fieldworkers in the eyes of the 
state. 
B. ETHNICITY AND CLAN REGIONALISM 
Like the other Central Asian states Tajikistan is demographically 
composed of several ethnic groups. 
14 Meshabi, 170. 
10 
According to a 1996 census, 
Tajikistan was 62.3% Tajik, 23.5% Uzbek, 7.6% Russian, with the 
remaining ethnicities ranging from Ukrainian to Korean. Significantly, in 
the 1924-25 National Delimitation of Central Asia schemes, the Soviets 
left roughly 37% of titular Tajiks outside of the new republic, mainly in 
Uzbekistan and Afghanistan.15 
Tajiks have no tribes, but strongly identify with their home regions, 
which form the basis for strong clan-like ties based on patron-client 
relations.16 Tajikistan's mountainous terrain lends itself to these regional 
divisions. The main regional divisions that have fostered large clans are: 
the Kulabi Valley in the south; the Garm areas in the eastern Pamiri 
mountains; the Leninabad Oblast, in the Ferghana Valley in the north; the 
Hisor Valley in the west; and the Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast in the 
southeast. 
C. ISLAM IN TAJIKISTAN 
Tajiks are vastly different from their Central Asian neighbors in 
that they speak Dari, a dialect of Farsi, which is the language spoken in 
most of Afghanistan and Iran. The majority of Tajiks are Sunni Muslims, 
adhering to the norms of the Hanifi School, a more flexible, adaptive 
15 Shirin Akiner, Central Asia: Conflict or Stability and Development, (London: Minority Rights 
Group, 1997), 28. 
16 Barnett Rubin, Tajikistan: From Soviet Republic to Russian-Uzbek Protectorate, in 
Central Asia and the World, ed. Michael Mandelbaum, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994), 
211. 
11 
branch of Islam.17 However, some clans in the isolated, mountainous 
Pamiri region are Ismaili or Shia Muslims. 
Islam penetrated into what is now Tajikistan in the second half of 
the seventh century. Over several hundred years, Sufism, a moderate, 
mystical form of Islam that stressed a balance of moral values and 
spiritualism, influenced Tajik culture. Sufism stressed the application of 
cultural values and tradition versus the absolute obedience to Shari'a as in 
the stricter, literal practices of the more doctrinaire branches of Islam in 
Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan. Sufism, as it was practiced in 
Tajikistan, was further refined by the influences of a socio-political 
doctrine called Naqshbandi or, more locally, Khojagon.IS This 
"brotherhood" within Sufism expected that the political leaders exercise 
flexible and careful judgment in the application of Shari' a in order to 
protect the peasantry. It stressed that Shari' a should not be hard and fast. 
It moved away from the earlier mysticism of Sufism to a more rational 
approach that worked to assist the masses. This less strict rendering of 
the Koran manifests itself in a more rational approach to life at all 
levels.19 
17 Meshabi, 182. 
18 Ruffm and Waugh, 181. 
19 Meshabi, 183. 
12 
D. ISLAM UNDER THE SOVIETS 
Despite decades of Soviet secularization, Muslim customs, 
traditions, and to a lesser extent, devout religious practices, have 
remained a large part of daily life in Central Asia. Traditions practiced in 
the home or in social clubs and away from the mosques were particularly 
widespread. For example, fasting during Ramadan, private and group 
prayer, and the celebration of Islamic festivals such as Mohammed's 
birthday, never ceased during the Soviet era. Perhaps the strongest 
manifestation of Islam's persistence was the adherence to what Muriel 
Atkin describes as Islamic "life-cycle" rituals. These rites, often 
involving the local mullahs, were widely observed throughout Tajik 
society, even by those who claimed not to be very religious. They include 
traditional Islamic weddings and funerals, the circumcision of infant 
males, the payment of a brideprice and the wearing by women of a large 
headscarf year round (the veil was outlawed).20 To fully understand the 
causes of political violence in Tajikistan and, indeed, throughout Central 
Asia and the Transcaucasus region, one must explore a complex array of 
relationships involving clan, regional, sub-regional, ethnic, economic, and 
nationalist divisions as well as international relationships. 
20 Atkin, 14-15. 
13 
E. ISLAM AND NETWORKS OF POWER 
Significantly, Tajikistan is the only republic of the former Soviet 
Union where the central communist government permitted regionalism to 
flourish, even up to the level of government policy.21 Traditional 
opposing factions were delineated not necessarily along religious or 
ethnic lines but according to the region of the country they inhabited. 
Clan and local loyalties were stronger than any other tied to religion and 
nationalism. This fact, along with the compounding problem of restrictive 
mountainous terrain has led to a lack of a clear Tajik national identity.22 
Clan allegiances have also hindered the efficient functioning of the state. 
Local loyalties have reduced military conscription rates, morale, and 
performance levels.23 
The fundamental social unit throughout Central Asia IS the 
mahallah or neighborhood association.24 The mahallah has traditionally 
provided a social security net, played a key role in religious education, 
21 Davlat Khudonazar,, Islam: A Threat to Central Asia? Retrieved 3 June 2000, from the World 
Wide Web: http://www.cpss.org/focus/foc895.txt, 1998. 
22 Dannreuther, 27. 
23 Glenn Curtis, ed., Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan: Country 
Studies,(Washington: Federal Research Division, 1997). 201. · 
24 Anara Tabyshalieva, The Challenge of Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Preventing 
Ethnic Conflict in the Ferghana Valley, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1999), 4. 
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and helped to establish and enforce social norms. The mahallah, 
composed normally of the village elders, who often met in teahouses, was 
in fact well incorporated into the regional political systems. The 
mahallah lobbied to allow the observance of social and religious 
traditions and practices, to better the general well-being of communities, 
and also acted at times as pressure groups which placed specific demands 
upon the local or governmental bodies. In other words, the mahallah 
facilitated collective action to address community matters that fell beyond 
the purview of the official party and thus managed to co-exist nonetheless 
alongside official government bodies.25 They acted as civil clubs, youth 
and religious organizations, economic cooperatives and often even as the 
local government itself.26 
The important legacy of these grassroots-level committees is that 
they permitted Islam to survive Sovietization through a careful nurturing 
of Islamic values and traditions. Ironically, the Soviet system itself 
perpetuated these local power structures by passively allowing their 
existence within a normally intolerant social structure, even actively 
recognizing some as legally sanctioned functional organizations. 
The mahallah remains a strong socio-political entity throughout 
Central Asia today. In Uzbekistan, for example, the goyernment 
25 Non-governmental Organisations of Tajikistan, Retrieved from the World Wide Web, 16 
November 2000: http://www .eurasianet.org/resource/tajikistanllinks/ngotajik.html 
26 Ruffm and Waugh, 166-167. 
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recognizes over twelve thousand mahallah, and actively uses them to 
assist in local administrative matters such as welfare programs.27 
As earlier stated, for centuries the people of Tajikistan were 
distinguished by regional clan affiliations and organizations, regardless of 
their ethnic and religious ties to one another and to peoples outside the 
immediate region. Without question, the Soviet introduction of collective 
farming, or the kolkhoz system, to the region during the 1920s deepened 
these affiliations and allegiances. 
Despite the best efforts of the Soviets to homogenize the population 
by settling groups into these large collective activities, their institution 
actually had quite the reverse effect, polarizing communities and 
strengthening the roles of the mahallahs, clans and extended families. 
The Soviets organized these farms and related industries along existing 
local identity groups that already, in most respects, worked and lived 
"collectively". This economic technique, so commonly used throughout 
the Soviet world, when implemented in Central Asia tended to reinforce 
local allegiances, lessening reliance on the state and strengthening 
existing patronage networks. The kolkhoz system's positive effect on the 
rural patronage networks was not lost on its urban constituency. Even if 
individuals migrated away from the fields to find work in the cities, they 
271bid., 168. 
16 
still fell under the protection of their rural kolkhoz and subsequently 
owed allegiance to it. 
Even when the Soviet government forcefully deported segments of 
the population to other areas under its "divide and rule" policy, Tajiks 
often resettled under the same social arrangements that they had in their 
original homeland. This occurred throughout Tajikistan. In fact, 
deportations of Tajiks within Tajikistan served to strengthen the power of 
the Tajik kolkhozes through shared hardship in the new and sometimes 
alien lands, and in competition for resources with the resident "foreign" 
clans.28 
The kolkhozes did much more than organize the work force; they 
represented the core of civil society for the more than two-thirds of the 
population that inhabited the rural regions. Most importantly, much like 
its smaller subset, the mahallah, the kolkhoz system provided a working 
framework for the continuation of extended family and clan networks that 
emphasized adherence to Muslim traditions and values. Muslim leaders 
retained their leadership positions of the mahallahs within the 
kolkhozes.29 
Kolkhozes themselves, meanwhile often competed with each other 
for scarce resources like land and water. Two rival kolkhozes, organized 
28 Ruffm and Waugh, 110-113. 
29 Ibid., 114. 
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along regional clan lines eventually fought each other during the 1992 
civil war. The Kulabi Kolkhoz, whose members represented a clan 
derived from the southern Kulab Valley, fought the Gharm Kolkhoz, 
whose clan originated in the Gharm Valley in the country's northern 
region. These regional clans had feuded over land and water rights since 
their incorporation into the Soviet Kolkhoz system in the 1930s.30 
Further degrading the Soviet socialization plan was the fact that the 
formation of the official communist party structures also replicated the 
segmentary pre-existing identity groups.31 The more dominant clans 
usually assumed dominant political roles within the communist system. 
Although the kolkhoz was dependent on the state economically, in terms 
of domestic management, the state exerted relatively little local authority. 
The party apparatchiks, who were supposed to play the role of agents of 
the state, came from the clans and tended to be more loyal to their 
respective clan than to the central communist government. Additionally, 
no security forces were stationed within or near most of the kolkhozes.32 
In cities where the kolkhozes were somewhat less influential, the 
mahallah circumlocuted the Soviet scheme to reorganize urban spaces by 
30 Ibid., 112. 
3! Ibid., 113. 
32 Ibid., 114. 
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simply moving entire clans into large apartment complexes, hence 
preserving the same social networks in a different locale.33 
Like the mahallah, the kolkhozes have done much to perpetuate 
both Islamic tradition in Tajikistan and perhaps, less constructively, they 
have deepened the political fragmentation wrought by patron-client 
networks. 
F. THE CIVIL WAR 
The Tajik republic realized independence in December 1991 as a 
signatory of the CIS Security pact, ostensibly allowing Moscow to 
guarantee its security and play a major economic role. Yet, the economy 
of Tajikistan, which had for the most part been dependent on Soviet 
support, was much too weak to support such a quick transition to 
independence, the economy quickly became a major source of conflict. In 
some areas, there was over fifty percent unemployment and a widespread 
sense of relative deprivation. Furthermore, the weak sense of Tajik 
national identity meant that nationalism could not be counted upon as a 
viable alternative to communism for eliciting for the new republic, as was 
the case in the four other new Central Asian states.34 
Another factor precipitating armed conflict was the relative. ease 
with which both sides could arm themselves. The security forces, 
33 Ibid., 167. 
34 Rubin, 208. 
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consisting mostly of Slavs and answering to Moscow, provided a ready 
made source of arms to one side while the long Tajik-Afghan frontier 
provided arms and money for the other.35 These factors led to an all out 
civil war that racked Tajikistan for five years at the cost of over 50,000 
dead. 
To the outside world, Tajikistan's civil war appeared to be a 
civilizational confrontation with the forces of Islam arrayed on one side 
against a secular, democratic government on the other. Actually, the war 
resulted more from competition among the regional patron-client networks 
with external political influences thrown into the mix, rather than between 
different and religious alliances.36 
In 1990, with the advent of Perestroika came the development of 
several groups opposed to the local communist elites who ran the country 
before and following independence. The government, known as Khujand-
Kulabi, was mostly representative of the Kulabi and Hisori clans with 
members drawn from clans in the Leninabad region.37 
The opposition parties aligned themselves under several ideological 
banners: cultural nationalist (the Rastakhez or Rebirth Party); religious 
35 Ibid., 209. 
36 Sergei Gretsky, Tajikistan: The Latest Gamble. Retrieved 3 June 2000 from the World Wide 
Web: http:www.cpss.org/focus, 1998. 
37 Charles Underland and Nicholas Platt, The Central Asian Republics: Fragments of Empire, 
Magnets of Wealth. (New York: The Asia Society, 1994), 58. 
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(the Islamic Renaissance Party or IRP); democratic (the Democratic Party 
or DP); and regional or sub-ethnic autonomist {The Ruby of 
Badakhshan).38 The opposition groups originated mostly from the Garmi 
and Badakhshoni clans.39 These groups had all been traditionally under-
represented in the ruling coalitions during Soviet and pre-Soviet rule. 40 
The IRP, whose members mostly came from the Garmi clan, was the 
largest and strongest opposition group overall, fighting long after the 
others capitulated. 41 
In May 1992, after just a few days of violent demonstrations and 
fighting, a coalition of opposition groups forced the president to form a 
new coalition government. In September, the president was forced to 
resign at gunpoint an:d opposition leaders assumed complete control. The 
Leninabad Oblast in the north refused to recognize this new government 
and shut itself off from the rest of the country in protest. Also, in 
retaliation against the opposition coalition government, Kulabi clans 
formed an army called Popular Front of Tajikistan with the help of 
Uzbekistan. Other armed militias from the Hisor Valley clans likewise 
38 Rubin, 213. 
39 Underland and Platt, 59. 
40 Non-governmental Organizations, Retrieved 16 November 2000 from the World Wide Web: 
http:/ /www.fas.org/man/ dod-1 01 I ops/war/tajikistan.htm 
41 Underland and Platt, 58. 
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sprang up to fight the new government. 42 By December 1992, the Popular 
Front prevailed over the opposition forces and returned power to the pre-
war communist government. 
Although the coalition government agreed to step down, the 
fighting continued unabated. The re-established government then 
appealed to the CIS to assist in stemming the violence. The mostly 
Russian and Uzbek CIS "peacekeeping" force arrived, but blatantly sided 
with the regime, immediately losing whatever legitimacy it may have had 
as a true peacekeeping force. Backed by Russian and Uzbek forces, the 
pro-government forces pushed the opposition forces south into 
Afghanistan and north into the Tajik mountains. Tens of thousands of 
refugees fled into Afghanistan, and hundreds of thousands fled the 
country for Russia and other CIS republics. Pro-government Hisori and 
Kulabis massacred thousands of Garmis and Badakhshonis in summary 
executions. 43 Only three months after the new coalition took over, the 
CIS "peacekeepers" had restored the communists to power. 
The violence however, continued as the various opposition groups, 
(but particularly the IRP and some members of the DP supported by 
fundamentalist Afghan forces), frequently executed raids and ambushes 
42 Ibid., 60. 
43 Ibid., 61. 
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from hideouts across the border with Afghanistan. Although these raids 
and incursions did not threaten central government control outside the 
border areas, they caused casualties, blocked roads, and interfered with 
the movement of relief supplies and refugees.44 
At the time of this writing, Russian and Uzbek armies and air forces 
still back Tajik government forces, and have recently been joined by 
Kazak and Kyrgyk troops in efforts to stop "Islamic terrorists" operating 
throughout the region. 
G. FOREIGN INFLUENCES ON THE CIVIL WAR 
As mentioned earlier, external influences were also at work in the 
civil conflict. Iran and Afghanistan both, for a while at least, supported 
various IRP factions. The Afghanis share the same religion and language 
as the Tajiks; additionally, more than two million ethnic Tajiks live in 
Afghanistan. In 1998, they were joined by tens of thousands of refugees 
from the now six-year old civil war. The Tajik rebels became more united 
and radicalized vis a vis Islam thanks to their relations with their Afghan 
brothers.45 Probably more important to the Tajiks than the military 
support of the local Afghan guerrilla leaders was the inspiration they drew 
from them in light of the Mujahedeen's "victory of Islam" over 
44 Non-governmental Organizations, Retrieved 16 November 2000 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/war/tajikistan.htm 
45 J. Anderson, The International Politics of Central Asia, (New York: Manchester University 
Press, 1997), 178. 
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Communism. 46 However, as it eventually had for the Afghans, violence 
became more an end in itself than a means for many Tajiks. 
Criminalization of the fighters increased as drug smuggling money bought 
guns and fed soldiers. 47 
As far as an Afghani agenda in Tajikistan, I could find only one 
reference. It is well known that certain Afghani generals dream of a 
greater Afghanistan--one that would, of course, include the Persian 
speaking Tajikistan. 48 However, it is unlikely that, given the internal 
strife in Afghanistan itself, Afghani rebels can continue to provide the 
political and military support needed to assist the IRP in its efforts to 
overthrow the regime in Tajikistan. 
Iran has also been involved m the conflict on the side of the 
Islamist factions. Significantly, the Shiite Iranians, for the first time, 
have openly supported a Sunni Muslim cause by backing the Tajik 
insurgents. This support has raised concerns for Western powers and the 
CIS as it suggests the possibility of all fundamentalist groups uniting 
under one banner. Even so, what may be more important to some of the 
46 Meshabi, 275. 
4 7 Anderson, 179. 
48 Vladimir Slipchenko, Russia's Political and Military Problems in Central Asia. Retrieved 
September 15, 1999 from the World Wide Web: 
http:/ /call.army.mil/call/frnso/frnsopubs/issues/slipfn 12.htm. ( 1995) 
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more doctrinaire Muslim rebels than arms or money is the model offered 
by the Iranian Revolution.49 
Iranian support, although enthusiastic at first, has turned out to be 
relatively constrained. Iran's greatest enemy remains Iraq. Since the 
Allies chose to allow Saddam Hussein to remain in power after the Gulf 
War, he still poses a threat to Iran. To prepare for the eventuality of war 
with Iraq, Iran relies heavily on a favorable arms trade with Russia.50 
Knowing how fearful the CIS is about an Islamic takeover in Central Asia, 
Iran will do nothing to alienate Russia as a potential ally in a second Iran-
Iraq war.51 
Factions within Iran and Afghanistan appear to have done more to 
bolster true Islamic fervor than most of the internal forces in Tajikistan. 
Although their influences have been limited due to their own domestic 
constraints, one can surmise that they have had great demonstration 
effects, and have had a spiritual impact on Islamic rebels in Tajikistan, at 
the very least. 
H. CONCLUSION 
Of all the newly independent states, it was thought that Tajikistan 
would be the most likely to "succumb" to an Islamic revival capable of 
49 Anderson, 174. 
50 Meshabi, 185. 
51 Dianne Smith, Central Asia: A New Great Game, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 
U.S. Army War College, 1996), 10. 
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replacing the status quo with a true Islamic state. Yet this has not 
happened, and as of this writing, there seems to be no popular movement 
in Tajikistan advocating the establishment of one. There appears to be 
little support for such a radical change in the ideology of the standing 
government not even from within the IRP, which is now a legal 
participating entity! In a recent interview with the New York Times, a 
Mr. Hizomov Mirzokhuzha, one of the IRP's two national level cabinet 
ministers summed up his feelings on the issue of an Islamic state in 
Tajikistan: 
"I was the chief military commander of the opposition during the civil 
war, and at that time until now there has never been any discussion of 
creating an Islamic republic. When I was fighting, I was fighting for 
justice for the citizens, for the women and the children and for no other 
purpose. Do we believe in God? Of course, we believe in God. We are 
the same as our ancestors, but as for Islam. I probably know more about 
Marxism and Leninism and so no one could call me an Islamic 
fundamentalist. "52 
This v1ew supports the idea that although Islamic traditions 
outlasted seventy-years of Soviet rule, the political face of Islam that can 
be seen elsewhere in the world was successfully suppressed to some 
extent. This, coupled with the very rational and traditional nature of 
Tajik Islamic practices leads one to conclude that a political revolt based 
on Islamic principles was never in the making in Tajikistan. 
52 Patrick Tyler, (2000, October 29). Islamic Revival Wears Many Faces in a Secular Asian 
Land. New York Times, p. 6. 
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Even if the Islamic Revival Party of the opposition coalition could 
have held out militarily, would they have formed a government based 
solely on Shari'a? Probably not since they were still part of a coalition of 
several parties with widely divergent motives. Furthermore, neither a 
Tajik nor an Islamic identity has been sufficient to provide a cogent 
unifying force for any political rebellion to hang on to power once 
attained.53 The ubiquitous adherence to clan regionalism has continued to 
undermine the successful prosecution of either a nationalist or Islamic 
claim to power. 
The pragmatic flavor of Tajik Islam is important for understanding 
the overall lack of cohesive support for the creation of a true Islamic state 
in Tajikistan, a state the average Tajik does not want or even understand 
particularly since his view of Islam revolves more around traditions than 
politics. 
53 Meshabi, 188. 
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III. FERGHANA VALLEY 
A. BACKGROUND 
High on the list of the world's "powder keg" regions is the 
Ferghana Valley in Central Asia. This, too, is a region that is widely 
characterized as a hotbed for Islamic fundamentalism. As of this writing 
major news agencies continue to report attacks and kidnappings by 
Islamic activists throughout the valley and its mountainous surrounds. 
Most of these assaults are attributed to the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU), an umbrella organization adhering to an extremely 
doctrinaire form of Islam known as Wahabbism. The IMU's constituents 
vow to topple the standing post-Soviet national governments and replace 
them with Islamic states. The number of activists is rumored to be in the 
low thousands, but they are thinly spread, lightly armed, and poorly 
organized. Nevertheless, the leaders of the three nation-states that 
comprise the Ferghana consider the threat to be significant enough that 
they have formed a regional security alliance to prevent an Islamic 
takeover. 
In addition to this continuous terrorist activity, there have been 
significant episodes of ethnic-political violence in the Ferghana since the 
break-up of the Soviet Union. Islam played a much more divergent role in 
each of the Ferghana's countries of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan than it now plays in the IMU's terror campaign. 
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Scholars and statesmen often view the Ferghana Valley as a 
microcosm of the entire Transcaucasus and Central Asia, insofar as it 
possesses all the historical and demographic sources of instability that 
plague the rest of the region. As such, exploring the different roles Islam 
has played m political violence there may be instructive for 
comprehending similar effects and relationships throughout Central Asia, 
and indeed throughout much of the rest of Eurasia. 
The valley itself is only approximately three hundred kilometers 
long and varies between twenty and seventy kilometers in width. Even 
though the land represents only five percent of the total of Central Asia, it 
contains roughly twenty-four percent of the region's population. Like 
most large valleys in extremely high mountainous regions, the Ferghana 
Valley is a main source of food and water. I It also is home to twenty-two 
percent of the region's industries.2 
The geography of the Ferghana Valley and its immediate surrounds 
has significant socio-political ramifications. First, forbiddingly high 
mountains cut off each of the three areas of the Ferghana Valley from the 
rest of their respective nation-states. Second, there are no natural barriers 
separating the three nations on the valley floor itself. These two critical 
1 Ferghana Valley Working Group of the Center for Preventative Action, Calming the Ferghana 
Valley: Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia, (New York: Century Foundation Press, 
1999), XV. 
2 Ibid., 139. 
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points of geography have created a region whose peoples have literally 
been separated from those responsible for governing them, whereas each 
of these peoples exists in juxtaposition with members of the other two 
national peoples. In other words, even though national boundaries sub-
divide the Ferghana Valley into three regions, it is vital to remember that 
to its eight million indigenous people, the Valley is historically, 
economically, and socially, a region unto itself. It was not until the new 
states each realized its own independence in the 1990s that those national 
borders solidified, ripping apart the Ferghana's social fabric. 
B. SOURCES OF REGIONAL INSTABILITY 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been a resurgence 
of Islamic activism along several fronts throughout the former Central 
Asian Soviet republics. Although most elements of this Islamic revival 
serve civic purposes, some of these fronts espouse violence against the 
secular regimes. Popular sentiment states that most, if not all, of the 
violence in the Ferghana Valley is the handiwork of radical Islamists. 
However, on closer examination, much of the political violence can be 
seen to not have been motivated by Islamic fundamentalism. Rather, 
political entrepreneurs have used Islam to organize and mobilize the 
overwhelmingly Muslim populace to further their own varied political 
agendas. 
The characterization of the post-Soviet era violence as primarily 
religious in nature appears, on the surface, to be rather convincing. 
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Indeed, the argument is not altogether incorrect; it is merely insufficient. 
To fully understand the causes of political violence in the region, one 
must explore a complex array of relationships involving clan, regional, 
sub-regional, ethnic, economic, and nationalist divisions as well as 
international relationships. There are even important allegiances owed to 
neighborhood associations called mahalla.3 Many of these combine to 
reinforce divergences, further complicating an already confusing array of 
connections and conflicts. 
Anara Tabyshalieva, a native Kyrgyk sums up the situation in post-
Soviet Central Asia in her study of the Ferghana Valley for the United 
States Institute for Peace: 
... over-population, a chronic decline in living standards, and ecological 
crises. These problems are further complicated by these states' ethnic and 
religious diversity... Central Asia's problems are indeed complicated and 
multi-faceted; so much so that standard approaches in the examination of 
such ethno-religious conflict typically ignore an underlying regional and 
clan-based competition over economic resources.4 
Tabyshalieva sees "social fragmentation" as the greatest threat to 
regional security throughout Central Asia. She considers this 
fragmentation on several levels. First, there are ethnic tensions between 
56 Anara Tabyshalieva, The Challenge of Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Preventing 
Ethnic Conflict in the Ferghana Valley, (Washington: United States Institute ofPeace, 1999), 4. 
57 Ibid. 
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the Slavs (Russians and Ukrainians) and the indigenous peoples; conflicts 
along these lines have primarily occurred in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan.s 
These tensions often reflect a struggle between the urban "haves" and the 
rural "have-nots". A second level of ethnic fragmentation exists between 
indigenous ethnic groups, for example the "Persian" Tajiks against the 
Turkic Uzbeks or Kazaks. The third level takes the form of regional 
cleavages within titular nationalities. Examples of this are the violent 
competition between the northern and southern regions of Kyrgyzstan, the 
competition among the three hordes in Kazakstan, or between the various 
provinces in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 6 
A 1999 study conducted by the Center for Preventative Action, an 
American think-tank active in the region, proposed the following rational 
sources for conflict within the Ferghana Valley: first, population 
pressure. According to the Center for Preventative Action study, the 
Valley's population density stood at 450 people per square kilometer in 
1989. This relatively high figure, coupled with an historical annual 
population rate growth of 2.6% is creating great instability, especially 
since over half of the current population is under the age of sixteen. 
SJbid., 5. 
6Jbid. 
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These youth will soon enter an already incredibly poor job market, and 
absolutely overwhelm it.7 
A second source of tension is the severe economic decline that has 
marked the post-Soviet era. When Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan 
became independent from the Soviet Union, they lost about one-fifth of 
their respective gross domestic product. The attendant changes from a 
central economy toward separate market-oriented economies have brought 
price inflation and a sharp drop in wages. Repeated poor harvests due to 
droughts and storms have devastated regional agriculture. The 
government of Tajikistan, consumed by a long and bloody civil war, 
seriously neglected both industry and agriculture in its Ferghana Valley 
provinces, aggravating an economy that was already headed for disaster. 
Linked to both the rapid rise in population and a devastated 
economy is the huge unemployment rate throughout the Valley. The 1999 
unemployment rate in the Uzbek part of the Valley stood at thirty-five 
percent, with most of the unemployed under the age of twenty-five. 
Adding to the general disaffection of Uzbekistan's unemployed is the 
widely held perception that the ethnic Kyrgyz unemployment figures are 
distinctly lower. 8 
7 Ferghana Valley Working Group, 60. 
8 Ibid., 65. 
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Such severe economic decline has had two deleterious socio-
political repercussions: one, it has made the Valley's people and 
administrations look like losers compared with their counterparts 
elsewhere in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Second, local 
economic woes exacerbate ethnic tensions within the Valley due to the 
perception that some groups may be better off than others.9 Indeed, 
perceptions of relative deprivation by identity groups have been the most 
common cause of violence in the region to date. 
The Center for Preventative Action study also lists the competition 
for land as a third major source of tension. The rising population rates 
coupled with national land schemes deemed ethnically unfair have led 
directly to violence across the region.10 
Water is the fourth key issue. Water is a precious resource that has 
been terribly managed by regional administrations. As in the Middle 
East, water rights are a constant source of tension both between states and 
within states.l1 The main sources of water entering the Ferghana are two 
rivers, the Amu Darya, originating in the mountains of Tajikistan and the 
Syr Darya, whose source is in Kyrgyzstan. Decades of over-exploitation 
in support of grandiose irrigation and industrial schemes by the Soviets 
91bid., 62. 
10 Ibid., 64. 
11 Ibid., 65. 
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had, by the 1980s, all but decimated an already fragile hydro-ecosystem.I2 
While scarcity is an obvious concern, the main source of tension is the 
administration of water allocation to downstream areas. In 1996, officials 
in the U.S. Embassy in Tajikistan reported that there was an undercurrent 
of suspicion that neighboring Kyrgyzstan was scheming to tap Tajik water 
to irrigate Kyrgyz farmland in the Ferghana Valley. 13 
Water is both a source of power and weakness. Some Tajiks speak 
of using water as an offensive weapon if war arose with Uzbekistan; 
poisoning the river, bursting dams to cause floods, or simply restricting 
the flow of water all been suggested.l4 As privatization schemes continue 
across the Valley, water administration, now centrally controlled in each 
region, will have to be reformed to prevent domestic feuds over water 
rights.I5 Several conflicts have already erupted over local water 
allocation as with other issues; the fault lines are usually ethnic. 
The fifth and sixth sources of tension that the Center for 
Preventative Action study mentions are the widespread corruption of 
government officials and the ubiquity of organized crime throughout the 
region. Typical Soviet legacies, both grew directly out of consumer 
12 Shirin Anker, Central Asia: Conflict or stability and Development?,(London: Minority Rights 
Group, 1997), 12. 
13 Ferghana Valley Working Group, 64. 
14 Akiner, 13. 
15 Ibid., 13. 
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product scarcity, poor oversight, and inadequate accountability at all 
levels of administration. Their adverse effects on the region are 
profound. Corruption has greatly added to the already huge public 
mistrust of government officials. Furthermore, it places enormous 
obstacles in front of ongoing attempts at democratic reform. As for 
organized crime, although its activities generate large amounts of cash to 
a segment of the population, it is nonetheless destabilizing, particularly 
given the huge trade in illegal narcotics, which precludes fundamental 
economic reform in the region.16 
The final source of tension the study cites is the dramatic vacuum 
in basic social services created by the withdrawal of the Soviets. Health 
and education services have declined significantly since 1991.17 
Within the national boundaries that divide the Ferghana Valley, the 
manifestations of these sources of conflict can be further specified: In 
Uzbekistan, the regime's fear of the relatively small group of Islamic 
activists linked to a broader Islamic revival is compounded by a mistrust 
of its neighbor states. The Uzbek regime blames Afghanistan and 
Tajikistan for harboring these terrorists, an allegation which both 
emphatically deny. In southern Kyrgyzstan, tensions exist between 
ethnically similar Uzbek and Kyrgyz populations. The large Uzbek 
16 Ferghana Valley Working Group, 69. 
17 Ibid., 76. 
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population there is believed by the local Kyrgyz to harbor irredentist 
hopes for autonomy. This is a theme heard throughout Central Asia, 
perpetuated by the Uzbek regime's domineering foreign policy.18 In the 
remaining third of the valley, in what is northern Tajikistan, there is 
resentment of the ruling elites who are primarily from the southern Tajik 
province of Kulab.I9 
These state-specific sources of unrest are smaller versions of what 
concerns Tabyshalevia as well as Martha Brill Olcott. Olcott explains the 
potential for conflict in Central Asia as a whole: 
The fact of ethnic and religious differentiation in Central Asia should not 
be understood as a portent of inevitable and ineluctable conflict. Uzbeks 
and Kyrgyz or Kazaks and Russians will not fight simply because they are 
Uzbek and Kyrgyz or Kazak and Russian. However, like many people 
who have been lied to, manipulated, cheated and abused long enough, any 
of these people could be provoked to seek quick and easy answers to the 
host of complex problems which beset them-in which case the rich 
human variety of Central Asia will provide a ready arsenal of ethnic and 
religious scapegoats.20 
An analysis of the political developments over the last decade also 
sheds light on the reasons for social discontent in the Ferghana. The 
sudden enforcement of the long ignored national boundaries partitioning 
the Ferghana Valley following independence has caused a rise in tensions. 
For centuries, the Valley had been treated as a common economic and 
18 Tabyshalieva, 9. 
19 Ferghana Valley Working Group, 13-14. 
20 Olcott, 18. 
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social unit, distinct from the rest of Central Asia. With independence, 
each sovereign state began to pursue different political and economic 
policies that disrupted the Ferghana's long-standing internal systems 
economic, educational, cultural, and even familial exchange. 
Additionally, regional power bases lost authority to the newly empowered 
central governments.21 With independence, the artificial and largely 
unnoticed inter-republican borders that Stalin designed in the 1920's 
became very real barriers. Customs houses and troops now stand guard 
where, for hundreds of years, merchants and shepherds freely traveled. 
This dissection is in and of itself a major cause of friction.22 
The Soviets, across their empire, had nationalized areas in an effort 
to create ethnic identities in their modern form. The largely artificial 
republican borders ignored the traditional means by which the inhabitants 
of the Ferghana Valley had historically identified themselves, according 
to their religious practices, place of settlement, and family or clan 
affiliation.23 The creation of nations and their respective ethnic identities 
provided the Soviets with the ability to "divide and rule". Thanks to the 
degree to which populations were already intermingled in Central Asia, it 
was simple to redraw titular national boundaries that placed large numbers 
21 Ferghana Valley Working Group, 12. 
22 Ibid., 37-38. 
23 Ibid., 40-41. 
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of ethnic groups within the borders of other republics. The Soviets then 
ensured that national elites were either ethnic Russian or loyal to 
Moscow. 
There were two consequences to different ethnic populations living 
together in a single nation. First, by granting a certain amount of 
autonomy to the various ethnic groups situations developed that allowed 
Moscow to act as an arbiter of ethnic disputes. Second, no republic was 
able to mount any significant mass protest against Soviet authority. In 
the end, however, with the removal of imperial law, there has been a 
burgeoning of ethnic tension and conflict. This is not unique to Central 
Asia. We have seen a similar phenomenon in the Balkans and in the 
Transcaucasus. 
All of these varied sources of instability served to open a door to 
violence. In addition to the ongoing terrorist campaign throughout the 
region, there have been several other significant episodes of political 
violence in the Ferghana. Two of the more major events were: The 1989 
ethnic riots in Uzbekistan and the Osh-Uzgen riots of 1990. In both 
cases, overpopulation, scarcities of water and arable land, economic 
hardships, and social differentiation reanimated forgotten historical 
grievances.24 There has also been a series of smaller scale violent 
incidents over the last decade. These range from near bloodless local 
24 Tabyshalieva, 19. 
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takeovers of administrations by Islamic groups in Uzbekistan to pitched 
battles involving discontented militias in Tajikistan. 
C. UZBEK-MESKHETIAN TURK VIOLENCE OF 1989 
The first significant political violence in the period just preceding 
and immediately following independence from the Soviet Union, involved 
rioting between Uzbeks and the resident Meskhetian Turk minority in 
Uzbekistan. The Soviets had deported the Mesk'hetian Turks from Georgia 
during World War Two as part of their "divide and rule" policy. The two 
groups are linguistically and religiously related and had co-existed 
peacefully in Uzbekistan for decades.25 
The violence reportedly began when a Meskhetian man overturned 
the market stall of an Uzbek woman he accused of having inflated the 
price of strawberries. This relatively minor incident quickly ignited riots 
and pogroms against Meshketians in several cities, resulting in the deaths 
of hundreds of people, mostly Turks. The basis for the Uzbek action was 
the perceived economic disparity between the two ethnically and 
linguistically similar peoples. Despite having peacefully coexisted under 
communist rule for decades, pitched battles ensued for over two weeks. 
The Uzbeks' goal was to rid their country of the Turks in the belief that it 
25 Tabyshalieva, 20. 
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would better their economic and social lot.26 Most of the Turks, again 
"helped" by the Soviets, fled the region to escape death. 
D. OSH-UZGEN RIOTS OF 1990 
A larger scale conflict erupted in the Kyrgyz portion of the 
Ferghana in June of 1990. Land redistribution, perceived unfair housing 
policies, the absence of ethnic Uzbeks in the upper echelons of the local 
and regional political administrations, and a desire for greater Uzbek 
autonomy are cited as the primary causes of the violence.27 The violence 
was sparked when a regional committee, formed to redistribute land and 
housing to economically deprived Kyrgyz, attempted to reallocate land 
belonging to an Uzbek- run collective farm in order to provide new 
Kyrgyz housing. The subsequent dispute led to a riot that was only put 
down by Soviet troops after the failure of the local police. The police 
themselves had greatly exacerbated the already volatile situation by firing 
blindly into the crowds.28 The violence quickly spread, resulting in large-
scale ethnic rioting in the Kyrgyz cities of Osh and Uzgen. An estimated 
three to five hundred people were killed, and over a thousand were 
wounded on both sides. Again, these ethnic groups had peacefully 
coexisted for centuries before this conflict. A week of what amounted to 
26 Ibid., 20. 
27 Ferghana Valley Working Group, 46-47. 
28 Ibid., 48. 
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intense ethnic cleansing nonetheless ensued, characterized by the mass 
raping of women and the mutilation of bodies.29 Witnesses reported that 
signs saying "Uzbek Meat-Free of Charge" were displayed on bodies in 
the streets.30 Sporadic ethnic violence continued well into August of that 
year. 
During the conflict, ethnically-based political parties capitalized on 
national exclusiveness themes in information campaigns pitting Uzbek and 
Kyrgyz against each other. Party leaders intentionally recruited the 
young, often unemployed, to fight for their respective causes. Local 
factional leaders used Islam as both a mobilizing agent and as an 
intensifier to first ignite political violence and later fan its flames, 
leading to extremes in ethnic violence. Although both ethnic groups were 
comprised of Muslims, the leaders were still able to mobilize sympathy by 
exposing religious tensions by pitting "good" Muslims against "bad" 
Muslims. The widespread use of religious slogans such as "return the 
holy places to the righteous Muslims", helped ratchet up the violence.31 
Both this clash and the violent episode between the Uzbeks and 
members of the Meskhetian-Turk minority foreshadow dangerous 
consequences for the future of political conflict in the Ferghana Valley 
29 Tabyshalieva, 20. 
30 Ferghana Valley Working Group, 47. 
31 Tabyshalieva, 10. 
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and across Central Asia, with local leaders able to link ethno-national 
identity platforms to perceived social or economic injustices. This 
admixture of motives is particularly intoxicating for the masses of young 
disaffected unemployed or underemployed Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, who were 
the primary perpetrators of the violence. 
E. OTHER VIOLENT EPISODES 
A discussion of several other violent episodes in the Ferghana 
valley should aid in rounding out the picture of the region's precarious 
security environment. In December 1991, a large group of mostly 
unemployed youths calling themselves Adolat took over the former 
communist party headquarters in Namangan, Uzbekistan, initially 
intending to use it as an Islamic center. Capitalizing on their quick 
success, they then widened their goals, eventually implementing a de 
facto Islamic self-rule over the city. They then issued demands for the 
institution of Shari' a, (Islamic law), over the whole of Uzbekistan. 
Initially, estimating the support for the group to be at 50,000, the Uzbek 
president Islam Karimov temporarily allowed the group to persist in 
power. However, he soon cracked down on them, arresting seventy-one of 
their leaders and forcing hundreds to flee the country.32 The significance 
of this incident is that it has permanently put Karimov on guard. Even 
though Karimov was sworn in to office with his hand on the Koran, his 
32 Ferghana Valley Working Group, 48-49. 
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regime has ruthlessly repressed any form of political Islam. The 
government authorities even discourage everyday Muslim traditions such 
as the wearing of veils and beards. 
Since the 1997 peace treaty that ended the Tajik Civil War, there 
has been a series of conflicts in post-war northern Tajikistan that 
continues to pose security concerns in its sector of the Ferghana Valley. 
Several renegade militias from the northern part of Tajikistan have 
engaged in what. amount to running battles. These Ferghana~based 
militias were largely excluded from the government which was formed 
predominantly by the leaders from the southern provinces after the war. 
In 1997, violence erupted in Leninabad, Tajikistan. Protesters 
demanded the removal of several unpopular local administrators whom the 
government had appointed as well as more local (northern) influence in 
the central government. During the ensuing demonstrations, the security 
forces killed five people and arrested hundreds. This was followed by a 
period of anti-state violence perpetrated by several local northern 
militias.33 
In 1998, the leader of one of these regional militias, an army 
colonel named Makhmud Khudoiberdiyev, an ethnic Uzbek, led a bloody 
uprising against the Tajik central government. With nine hundred soldiers, 
he attacked government forces in the northern city of Khujand. 
33 Ibid., 50. 
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Interestingly, this particular Tajik city was part of Uzbekistan until 1929. 
The uprising failed; the fighting left over two hundred killed and over 
five hundred wounded on both sides. 
Uzbekistan. 
Khudoiberdiyev then fled to 
During 1997 and 1998, there were several other serious incidents of 
political violence in the Ferghana Valley. Beheadings and other murders 
of local administrators, car bombs, and raids throughout the region have 
created a situation of grave instability. These are usually blamed on 
Afghan or Saudi-backed Wahabbi terrorists. There is some speculation 
that many of these acts were carried out to aid in the illegal trafficking of 
narcotics which is a mainstay of many local economies.34 
Meanwhile, as recently as February of 1999, stx car bombs 
exploded m the Uzbek capitol, Tashkent. The government arrested 
members of a Ferghana based Islamic militant group. Government 
officials, however, doubting the group's capacity to carry out such a 
sophisticated plan, openly speculated that this was the work of foreign 
hands.35 Several local conflicts continue to erupt over land and water 
rights. 
34 Ibid., 70. 
35 Ibid., 54. 
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F. ISLAMIC TERRORISM IN THE FERGHANA 
Ethnic politics notwithstanding, there are Islamic activists who 
have executed violent acts in order to establish Shari' a as the law of the 
republics. Even these groups however, are not devoid of political 
ambitions. Their attacks against the various regimes are expressive in 
that they heavily use Islamic rhetoric and symbolism, yet their agendas 
are decidedly instrumental. 
The distinction between religious actors and political terrorists is 
often blurred in political Islam. It can be intuitively stated however, that 
Islamic terrorism is clearly non-millennia! in character, a supposition that 
makes differentiating it from political terror all the more difficult. As 
David Rappaport, an expert on terrorism, states: "Although everyone has 
noticed the phenomenon, no one has yet distinguished the characteristics 
of holy terror from those of political or secular terror".36 Since 1995, the 
most radical of these religious terrorist groups operating in the Ferghana 
Valley exist under the doctrinal umbrella of Wahabbism, an ultra-
conservative Islamic movement originating in Saudi Arabia. The 
fundamental overarching goal of Wahabbi movements throughout the 
region is the removal of the current secular regimes, followed by the 
emplacement of Islamic governments. Despite the ubiquitous Islamic 
36 David Rappaport, "Sacred Terror", in Origins of Terrorism. Ed. Walter Reich, (Washington: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 104. 
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revival seen throughout Eurasia, it appears that the Wahabbi terrorists are 
estranged from the great majority of their own Muslim constituency by the 
latter's more rational and less rigid approach to the role religion plays in 
their everyday lives. 
Wahabbism, a strict puritanical Islamic sect that dominates Saudi 
life, came to Central Asia relatively late, in 1912.37 The sect has enjoyed 
a revival in recent years thanks, in large part to huge monetary donations 
from supporters of Wahabbism in Saudi Arabia. 
One of the more recent and infamous Saudi envoys of Wahabbism is 
the "arch-terrorist" Usama Bin Laden, who went to Afghanistan to not 
only fight the Soviets but to re-instill Wahabbism in Central Asia.38 
Wahabbi terrorist groups are widely suspected of perpetrating many of the 
attacks in the Ferghana Valley. These have ranged from the bombing of 
state buildings, car bombs, kidnapping of foreign nationals, assassinations 
of minor government officials and security forces. The terrorist's 
strength is unknown but they probably number in the thousands. They 
37 Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? (London: Oxford 
University press, 1994), 44. 
38 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 84. 
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reportedly retreat to occupy safe havens in Tajikistan and Afghanistan 
after their attacks.39 
Most of the Wahabbi groups appear to be relatively new: scarcely 
any are mentioned in sources before 1995. The great majority of them are 
based in Uzbekistan, but there is some activity in Tajikistan, southern 
Kyrgyzstan, and southern Kazakhstan. The four groups that are 
mentioned most frequently are the Hezb-e Tahrir (variously translated as 
Liberation or Correction Party); the Akromiya (named after the founder, 
Akrom Yuldashev), also known as the Iimonchilar (Believers) or 
Khalifatchilar (Caliphate Supporters); and the most prolific, the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan. 40 It would appear that these terrorists groups 
are finding fertile ground in which to sow the seeds of violent dissent 
given the myriad divisions among the Ferghana's inhabitants as described 
earlier. On the other hand, the rational, morality-based Sufi brand of 
Islam traditionally practiced in Central Asia may inhibit a truly 
doctrinaire terrorist movement with seemingly less than perfectly rational 
intentions from gaining ground. 
39 U.S State Department, Global Terrorism: Background Information on Terrorist Groups, 
Retrieved 30 May, 2000, from the World Wide Web, 
http:/www .state.gov/www/ globa1/terrorism/1999report!appb.html 
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Although each of these Wahabbist organizations face inordinate 
difficulties in mobilizing the population given so many different political 
and cross-cutting allegiances, the secular ruling regimes may be 
inadvertently assisting the terrorists through their over-reactions. The 
current Uzbek regime, for instance, is cracking down on everyday Muslim 
customs and traditions by doing things such as banning the call to prayer 
via loudspeakers and the wearing of the veil by devout Muslim women. 
This plan of attack against seemingly non-politically motivated popular 
activities and traditions could turn the majority of the Muslims against the 
regime and encourage them into the Wahabbi camp. This would spell 
disaster for the regimes and create for Central Asia and its neighbors 
difficulties of "Koranic" proportions. 
G. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, one can surmise that although the political violence 
in the Ferghana Valley has a demonstrably Islamic flavor, particularly 
when analyzing the Wahabbi terrorist campaign, this simplistic 
characterization is at best insufficient, at worst dangerous. For example, 
the Uzbek regime's answer to stabilizing the Ferghana valley is to crack 
down on anything Islamic, which then precludes it from addressing and 
redressing the real cause of tensions in the region. Worse, this is bound 
to backfire on the regime since it encourages disaffected non-political 
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Muslims to move closer to radical lslamism in the face of the Ferghana 
Valley's serious societal decline. 41 
41 Ibid., 10. 
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IV. ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN 
A. BACKGROUND 
The 1992-1994 conflict between Christian Armenians and Moslem 
Azerbaijanis that left over twenty-five thousand people dead and over a 
million homeless, requires a different approach for understanding the 
roles Islam and its frequent bedfellow, nationalism, play in generating 
ethnic violence. The conflict here has manifested itself in a bloody 
struggle over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, a mainly Armenian oblast 
squarely situated in Moslem Azerbaijan that holds historical and cultural 
significance for both sides. 1 Unlike Chechnya and Tajikistan, both sides 
resorted to extensive ethnic violence resulting in horrific atrocities. This 
"holy war" scenario appears to fit Samuel Huntington's epic clash of 
Christianity versus Islam to a tee. 
Huntington lists the intensification of this particular conflict early 
in his book as an example supporting his civilizational paradigm.2 In a 
chapter entitled "The Dynamics of Fault Line Wars", he delineates 
between three levels of players in a conflict. At the ground level are the 
fault line participants. In this situation, these would be the Armenian 
secessionists in the Nagorno-Karabahk enclave and their opposition, the 
1 Michael Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: causes and Implications, (Westport CT: 
Praeger Press 1998), xii. 
2 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order, (New York: 
Touchstone, 1996), 38. 
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Azeri government and people. Huntington's second level is slightly 
removed from the conflict, which in this case would be the Armenian 
government. External interested players comprise the tertiary level, here 
to include Russia, Turkey, and Iran.3 Involvement at the tertiary level, 
especially by Iran, explains Huntington's paradigm. However, interests at 
the primary level should be the focus of interventionary efforts. The 
danger in Huntington's paradigm is that the first level players' agendas 
may be perceived to be aligned with or even to have been supplanted by 
the interests of the secondary or tertiary levels. This misperception could 
prove troublesome if it is used in planning preventative engagement and 
post-conflict operations, because the assumptions made may have no real 
bearing on the situation in the area of operation. 
In fact, after a brief review of the roles and actions undertaken by 
external or tertiary players in this case, one sees that tertiary players did 
not act to support either side in order to further a Christian or Islamic 
civilizational crusade. Instead, Iran and Turkey acted purely to protect 
their own interests in two areas: First, each has a strong stake in the 
Caspian oil markets and second, they are concerned with the security of 
their own frontiers and regime stability within their own territories. In 
the case of Russia, we can add a strong desire to keep the region within 
its sphere of influence. Russia has two key reasons for this: First, it 
3 Ibid., 272-273. 
54 
wants complete control over existing oil and its proposed transit. Second, 
it is paranoid about Islamic fundamentalism and as such desires a strong 
leadership role in the regional security framework. Moscow sees 
Azerbaijan as a reliable bulwark against perceived Islamic activism 
generated by Iran. 4 Similarly, it fears contagion of ethnic strife leading 
to separatist clashes throughout its other ethnically diverse republics. 
Throughout the conflict, Moscow's support of one side or another 
fluctuated with bewildering frequency.5 Initially, Moscow supported the 
Azeris but later, in what some scholars describe as indicative of the 
primal Russian fear of the northward spread of Islamic fundamentalism, 
switched sides. Turkey and Iran did assist Azerbaijan because of cultural 
and religious affinities. However, the significant large Turkish and 
Iranian cross-border operations Huntington cites were mainly conducted 
to contain the war within the borders of Azerbaijan. 
A second and perhaps more applicable observation Huntington 
makes is that as a "fault-line" conflict progresses, the sides tend to rely 
more and more on their "civilizational" identity to rally their forces. This 
is especially true for the losing side. The most popular form of this 
identification throughout the region has been religion and the best 
4 Suzanne Goldberg, The Pride of Small Nations: The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder, 
(London: Zed Books Ltd. ,1994), 59. 
5 Ibid., 63. 
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examples of this process to date have involved Islam. Huntington states 
that Islam readily lends itself to this phenomenon: 
"Fault line wars are by definition local wars between local groups with 
wider connections and hence promote civilizational identities among their 
participants. The strengthening of civilizational identities has occurred 
among fault line war participants but was particularly prevalent among 
Muslims. A fault line war may have its origins in family, clan, or tribal 
conflicts, but because identities in the Muslim world tend to be U-shaped, 
as the struggle progresses the Muslim participants quickly seek to broaden 
their identity and appeal to all oflslam ... "6 
This concept IS clearly consistent with other theories of 
mobilization as was seen earlier in the case of the Tajik civil war. In 
large measure, I agree with Huntington's end state, in as much "as 
multiple identities fade and the identity most meaningful in relation to the 
conflict comes to dominate, that identity almost always is defined by 
religion."7 However, I suspect that beyond the basic need to broaden the 
base of support locally, there is the ever present need to support one's 
forces logistically via appealing to secondary and tertiary players. 
Furthermore, a cultural alliance with what Huntington calls "core 
civilizational states" like Iran has permitted the trendy application of 
information operations or pyswar by the more flexible diaspora 
communities in those and other countries. 
6 Huntington, 268. 
7 Ibid., 267. 
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alter the motives and interests of the primary players. It may only reflect 
the fundamental needs of a struggling faction, namely a broad base of 
support for war and the physical capability to wage that war. The conflict 
over Nagorno-Karabakh was very much a battle of identities. Although 
those identities could easily be delineated along religious lines, the 
struggle however, was not undertaken for religion; it was fought over 
territory or, perhaps more accurately, what that territory symbolized to 
each of the warring factions. In the next section, I will explore just how 
important this "territory" was to the average Armenian and Azeri. Since 
in this conflict, the link between the land held and national identity 
shaped the motivations of the factions and was the real cause of the war. 
This resulted in perhaps a less grand crusade than a civilizational struggle 
between East and West, but was instead a struggle for two peoples to 
cling to what they know as their own national identity, not reaching out to 
a wider civilizational embrace. 
B. NATIONAL IDENTITY 
My study of this conflict shows that for the Azeris, Islam was 
indeed an essential popular mobilizer. For the Armenians, however, their 
religion was subsumed by their nationalism. Although, as throughout the 
Transcaucasus and Central Asia, the two areas are culturally and 
ethnically very diverse, the religious and ethnic divides among these two 
peoples, especially on the Armenian side, were singular enough to 
distinctly divide them into warring peoples. The key motivator for both 
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sides was territorial in nature; specifically they fought for sovereignty 
over Nagorno-Karabakh. 
1. Armenia 
For a former Soviet republic, Armenia is relatively homogeneous 
ethnically. As such, it has been free from internal ethnic strife and is the 
only newly independent state to have maintained its post-Soviet era 
opposition government. 8 Furthermore, Armenians can more readily 
identify themselves as members of a nation than can people in the former 
republics. As Ronald G. Suny explains: The Armenians have been able to 
distinguish a national identity since the fourth century A.D. by their 
adherence to an exclusive form of Monophysite Christianity. In the fifth 
century A.D., Saint Mestrop devised an alphabet for the Armenian 
language.9 These two characteristics formed the fundamental basis for an 
Armenian uniqueness. An isolating mountainous geography reinforced 
this commonality over the centuries. Additionally, Armenia's 
strategically important position, providing the surrounding empires an 
intercontinental bridge, imposed centuries of external pressures. 
For most of its history, outsiders have ruled Armenia. The list 
includes the Romans, Sassanids, Byzantines, Arabs, and Mongols. 
8 Ronald Suny, Provisional Stabilities, International Security, Vol.24, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
UniversityPress, 1999), 153. 
9 Glenn E. Curtis, ed. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies, (Washington DC: 
HQDA, 1995), 10. 
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However, the most significant ruling empires were the Ottomans and the 
Russians. Their, identity-shaping influences ranged from an intensive 
russification effort and persecution by Imperial Russia to genocidal 
campaigns by the Ottomans in the late 1890s. The Ottoman sultan 
conducted a massive anti-Armenian pogrom in 1895 when Turkish troops 
slaughtered 300,000 Armenians in Anato1ia. The sultan was responding to 
Armenian tendencies towards Europeanization which reinforced his view 
that the Armenians were represented as a subversive element.10 
Armenians felt surrounded by their Moslem neighbors and a rising 
economic elite felt the "backward" Ottomans would not carry Armenia 
forward. They reached out to the West during the Congress of Berlin in 
1878 asking for, but not receiving European protection. 
Russia and Britain did begin to take an interest in the "Armenian 
Question" and act on their behalf on several occasions. During World 
War One, as the Allies advanced on Turkey, the Ottoman leadership again 
ordered pogroms against the Armenians. Historians estimate the death 
toll for this round to be between 600,000 and two million people.ll 
This continual oppression by one empire after another further 
reinforced an isolated, mistrustful and warlike Armenian national 
10 Ibid., 14. 
11 Ibid., 13. 
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character.12 While Armenia itself suffered from continual foreign rule, 
Nagorno-Karabakh enjoyed relative autonomy given its geographic 
stronghold. For Armenians, Nagorno-Karabakh thus represented a bastion 
in which Armenian culture thrived.13 Despite these relatively strong 
identity-creating factors, the Karabakh conflict itself had a significant 
effect on the national Armenian consciousness. 
The aforementioned factors added up to a more isolated nationalist 
identity reinforced by victory in the conflict and opposition from the 
international community. In practice, this exclusivist nationalism led to a 
self-reliant foreign policy uncompromising in negotiating the Karabakh 
question during the post-war years.14 Officially, the principal combatants 
in the conflict were "Karabakh Armenians", but the significance of 
sovereignty over Karabakh was not lost on all Armenians. The isolative 
and unique nature of Armenian national identity gives some insight into 
why Nagorno-Karabakh has proven to be such a significant symbol, whose 
sovereignty is worthy of full-scale conflict. 
Additionally, the struggle for Nagorno-Karabakh is related to 
Armenian nationalist bids for independence from the Soviet Union in 
1988. The increasing Armenian concern over the status of the 
12 Croissant, 5. 
13 Ibid., 139. 
14 Suny, 141. 
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Azeri-ruled, but largely autonomous oblast, combined with two other 
causal factors to set off a strong Armenian nationalist movement. The 
first of these was an increasing mistrust of and anger toward a pervasively 
corrupt and arrogant Armenian communist elite. Second, were growing 
fears of an ecological disaster due to heavy urbanization and 
industrialization.15 Armenians feared that the 200,000 ethnic Armenians 
who inhabited the oblast would suffer the same cultural and demographic 
fate as Armenians in a second similar region in Azerbaijan called 
Nakhichevan. During the seventy years of Soviet rule, Nakhichevan's 
Armenian population declined by over four-fifths. Concurrently 
Armenians there were suppressed culturally and linguistically. The issue 
of Nagorno-Karabakh became the main rallying cry for Armenian 
nationalism. 
Beyond regional or international politics, however, the affinity 
Armenians hold for the region lies in its history of isolation from 
empirical pressures. Throughout Armenia's long history of oppression 
and persecution, Nagorno-Karabakh has remained relatively free. It is a 
bastion of Armenian culture, untouched by the ruling empires. 
15 Ibid., 18. 
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2. Azerbaijan 
Azeri perceptions of self-identity are much harder to trace than are 
those of the Armenians.l6 R. Gregor Suny suggests that a lack of a 
distinct national identity was a principle contributing cause for the defeat 
of the Azeris in the Karabakh war. He claims this shortcoming manifested 
itself in the inability of successive governments to recruit young Azeri 
men willing to fight the war.17 
Until recently, the Azeris had no common language or religion from 
which to form an identity. The same external forces that shaped the 
uniqueness of Armenian culture tended to pull Azeri identity in two 
directions. Unlike the Armenians who shrank from aligning their culture 
with their imperial rulers, the Azeris reached out to theirs, in this case the 
Sunni Turks and the Shia Iranians.l8 Eventually, religious affinities drew 
Azeris closer to Iran while ethno-linguistic closeness bound them to 
Turkey.l9 However, as Michael Croissant points out: " ... the Azerbaijani 
people have been prone to secularism throughout their history, thus 
limiting, in some circles the desirability of close ties with the Islamic 
16 Ibid., 6. 
17 Suny, 159. 
18 Ronald G. Suny, Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet 
Union, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 33. 
19 Croissant, 7. 
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Republic of Iran" .20 Interestingly, in contrast to what occurred in the 
Central Asian soviets, the seventy-odd years of Soviet repression of Islam 
were highly successful m Azerbaijan. In addition to encouraging 
secularization amongst the urban Azeri elites during the oil-driven 
industrialization of the late pre-Soviet era, a Soviet campaign to repress 
Islamic culture appears also to have succeeded. Surveys conducted in the 
early 1980s show that most Moslems did not really understand the 
meaning of Shari'a law and many had little knowledge of Islamic 
history.21 
The cultural and religious affinities the Azeris developed with their 
former rulers tended to retard the development of a distinct Azeri national 
identity. I would posit that because of the lack of a robust sense of 
national identity Islam was needed more to rally Azeris than Christianity 
was needed in Armenia. Samuel Huntington observed that, as in the Tajik 
civil war, the Azerbaijani government "played the Islamic Card" to 
broaden its base of support for the war against the Armenians. In any 
event, a fervent sense of nationalism, or the appearance of a national 
identity, was also a sufficient mobilizer as well as the causus belli. 
20 Ibid., 68. 
21 Audrey Altstadt, "Azerbaijan's Struggle Towards Democracy", in Conflict, Cleavage, and 
Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot, eds., (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 145. 
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The enemy for the Muslim Azeris was clearly Christian Armenia and 
the reason to fight was the preservation of sovereign Azeri territory. 
Azeris were not fighting the infidel Armenians to secure religious 
freedom or to establish a Moslem state. They were fighting to maintain 
the political arrangements over the governance of Nagorno-Karabakh. 
Because they lacked a strong sense of historical continuity, territory for 
the Azeris became the central national identifier. In their view, Nagorno-
Karabakh was the heartland of Turkic presence and the birthplace of Azeri 
nationalism. The Azeris still view the region as the heartland of Turkic 
presence and the birthplace of Azeri nationalism.22 
In a sense, then the true interests of the two enemies were fiercely 
nationalistic and both tied to territorial sovereignty. Islamism, in the 
Azeri case, simply defined the amplifying principal difference between 
the warring factions. 
C. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
As with Central Asia, Mother Russia sowed the seeds for potential 
conflict in the region by a cruel colonization, first undertaken by imperial 
Russia and later by Soviet russification efforts. Czarist Russian policies 
in the nineteenth century produced a class distinction between Armenians 
and Azeris throughout the region. Armenians benefited disproportionately 
22 Croissant, 139. 
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from economic advances.23 The potential for ethnic unrest greatly 
increased when Caspian oil was discovered in the late 1800s. This led to 
an influx of ethnic Russians, Armenians, and others who moved to the 
capital city of Baku in order to reap the oil wealth. 
Oil had two far-reaching effects on the domestic politics and 
cultural climate of Azerbaijan. First, oil's inherent economic and 
political buoyancy led to a rapid rise in an independently-thinking Azeri 
elite in Baku in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Concurrent with widening socio-economic divergences were pan-Turkic 
efforts made by a declining Ottoman Empire intent on uniting Turkic 
peoples throughout Eurasia. These campaigns, undertaken by the Turks in 
1905 and again in 1918, fueled the already fast-growing lower-class Azeri 
hatred of local Armenians who Azeris regarded as being economically 
better off. Simultaneously, Armenians began to associate the Azeri Turks 
with the perpetrators of the past Turkish pogroms and genocidal 
massacres of Armenians. Finally, the Czarist policy of "divide-and-rule" 
exacerbated the already tense situation.24 Widespread violence finally 
erupted in 1905 with murderous riots in Baku setting a bloody precedent 
for future and frequent conflict between two sides. 
23 Ibid., 8. 
24 Croissant, 8. 
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One of the results of the 1905 riots was the addition of a territorial 
component to the regional enmity. Competing nationalist movements 
developed side by side in the largely Armenian oblasts of N agorno-
Karabahk and Nakhichevan, which were attached by the Czar to 
Azerbaijan for economic and strategic reasons. Since the early modern 
era Nagorno-Karabakh had been ruled by Armenian pnnces. While 
Nagorno-Karabakh had a decidedly Armenian majority, (with a population 
ratio of about three-to one), the history supporting both Armenian and 
Azeri nationalistic claims is decidedly unclear! Suffice it to say that the 
oblast is highly contested among the scholars and historians of both 
countries. 
Immense ethnic violence again hit the region during World War One 
with the alliance of the Azeris with the Turks against the Armenians who, 
in light of their genocidal treatment at the hands of the Turks, naturally 
sided with the Allies. A successful Armenian insurgency fought the 
Azeris and the Turks during the Ottoman occupation of the region 
following the War until the British arrived in late 1918. The British, 
hoping to curry favor with oil rich Baku, also attached Nagorno-Karabakh 
to Azerbaijan. The insurgency kept fighting. Armenia and Turkey 
continued open conflict over disputed territories into 1920 when Armenia 
capitulated. When the region was sovietized in 1923, the disputed 
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region's status quo was confirmed and continued by Stalin in the "divide 
and rule" vein.25 
The Communists harshly subdued nationalistic violence until 1988, 
when the Soviet Empire's strong central authority started to wither. 
However, they never fully stamped out the nationalistic and irredentist 
desires of both Armenia and Azerbaijan over claims to Nagorno-
Karabakh. 
In the early 1960s activists in Armenia and in N agorno-Karabakh 
began to agitate for the incorporation of the region into Armenia without 
success. It was not until the late 1980s that Gorbachev' s policy of 
openness allowed a re-emergence of nationalist groups in the region. The 
rallies for the re-unification of Nagorno-Karabahk led to political 
violence in late 1987 and early 1988. Demonstrations by Karabakh 
Armenians led to violent reactions from disaffected Azeris in the 
industrial town of Sumgait who went on a killing spree, invading hospitals 
and dragging Armenians off buses. Fears about ethnic cleansing in each 
country spawned a refugee crisis with people fleeing to their own 
"homeland", wher they often returned to an inhospitable socio-economic 
environment. Over time, the refugees became a radicalizing force fueling 
inter-communal clashes through 1990.26 
25 Ibid., 19. 
26 Ibid., 28. 
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Contributing to the spread in the violence was Moscow's perceived 
inability or willingness to handle the crisis. The Kremlin, of course, was 
reluctant to bless nationalistic claims lest it open a Pandora's box of 
similar claims for independence amongst its hundreds of ethnic groups. 
At the same time, it appeared too timid to contain the violence. 
Gorbachev promised concessions to both sides, but no clear policy from 
Moscow was apparent. Eventually, Moscow placed Karabakh under direct 
rule for roughly a year. This period saw much political maneuvering 
along with nationalistically-motivated riots and strikes which left both 
sides fervently opposed to each other and to Moscow. Moscow's 
intransigence ended with the so-called "Black" January of 1991 when 
Soviet troops crushed nationalistic violence by occupying Baku and 
imposing martial law on the soviet. Moscow reinstalled a pro-communist 
government and then joined forces with it to destroy the Armenian 
movement to re-acquire N agorno-Karabahk.27 
Soviet military units, originally sent to separate warring factions, 
(as we observed in Tajikistan) changed roles and combined with Azeri 
units to wage a brutal campaign in and around the oblast to rid the region 
of Armenian malcontents. These units destroyed Armenian militias and 
forcibly deported ethnic Armenians, replacing them with Azeri refugees. 
27 Ibid., 38. 
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These same combined forces later attacked three villages in Armenia 
proper to eradicate guerrilla operations.28 
These operations galvanized both Armenia and Armenian 
nationalists in Nagorno-Karabahk for both an open war with Azerbaijan 
and strengthened Armenia's recent moves towards independence from the 
Soviet Union .. Following the 1991 coup in Moscow, both Azerbaijan and 
Armenia declared independence, Soviet troops pulled out of the region, 
and a major escalation of local violence ensued.29 
Essentially, the final break-up of the Soviet Union lifted any 
residual restraints on violent nationalistic actions. Full-scale war 
between both newly sovereign nations erupted in early 1992 and continued 
until the cease-fire in 1994. 
The Supreme Soviet of the former oblast proclaimed independence 
m January of 1992, sparking a large Azerbaijani offensive. The 
Azerbaijanis did not fare well and one of the casualties was their 
president, forced by an irate population to resign over his national army's 
defeat by ethnic Armenian militiamen.30 Throughout 1992, the Armenians 
held most of the disputed oblast while fierce fighting continued despite 
several Iranian brokered cease-fires. Turkey threatened involvement on 
28 Ibid., 40-41. 
29 Ibid., 43. 
30 Ibid., 78. 
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the Azerbaijani side when Armenian forces attacked the other contentious 
region, Nakhichevan, which is contiguous to the northern Turkish border. 
At this point, Russia after remaining well away from the conflict for many 
months, stepped in with a stern warning to the Turks to stay out of the 
war.31 
The fortunes of war shifted back and forth as both sides fought 
bloody battles in and around Nagorno-Karabahk with a decidedly 
favorable swing back to the Azeris in the fall and winter of 1992. This 
shift coincided with a change in government in Baku and a subsequent 
shift to a foreign policy focusing on Turkey as opposed to Russia and the 
CIS. This change occurred for three reasons. First, the new Azeri 
leadership viewed the secular, democratic, market-oriented Turkish 
system as an appropriate model to which to aspire. Second, as mentioned 
before, Azeri culture, more closely resembled Turkic rather than Slavic 
culture. Finally, the Azeris correctly suspected and accused Moscow of 
openly siding with Armenia in the struggle, a shift from the early days of 
the war.32 
Both the Russians and the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE) began mediation efforts. The CSCE was unsuccessful, 
31 Ibid., 82. 
32 Ibid., 84. 
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but the Russians managed to negotiate a five-month cease-fire that neither 
side honored. 
The beginning of 1993 saw an Armenian reversal of the recent 
Azeri victories, with Armenian forces holding the northern half of 
Nagorno-Karabakh by March of that year. Later that spring, the Armenian 
successes led them to carry the fighting outside of the disputed region and 
into Azerbaijan proper. The war came dangerously close to both Turkey's 
and Iran's northern frontiers threatening to widen the conflict. Indeed, 
Armenia's Seventh Army, still ostensibly controlled by Moscow and 
partially staffed by Russian officers, was poised to clash with Turkey's 
Third Army.33 The United Nations, fearing a broader regional conflict, 
finally passed Resolution 822 to force a cease-fire. 
Regardless, the fighting continued not only between Armenian and 
Azerbaijani forces but also among the Azeris themselves as a power 
struggle ensued between the president and opposition groups. A coup in 
June of 1993 installed a new Azeri government that was more loyal to 
Moscow, leading some to suspect heavy Russian involvement.34 The 
Karabakh Armenians took full military advantage of the Azeri political 
disarray and continued to press deeper into Azeri territory, prompting a 
second round of diplomatic pressure from Turkey and Iran. This led to a 
33 Ibid., 88. 
34 Ibid., 90. 
71 
second United Nations resolution, known as Resolution 853. This act 
again called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, but additionally 
affirmed sovereign boundaries and recognized the local Armenians as a 
legitimate entity. This occurred as Armenian gains forced tens of 
thousands of Azeri refugees toward the Iranian border. Iran, already 
fearful of malcontents in its own sizeable Azeri population sent armed 
units three to four kilometers inside Azerbaijan to set up a buffer zone to 
protect both the refugees and prevent their entry into Iran. Similarly, the 
Turks increased their military presence along their Armenian border. 
Again, in October of 1993, fearing a wider conflict, the United Nations 
passed a third act, Resolution 874 condemning the violence and calling 
for an immediate cease-fire. As Armenian forces pushed the Azeris 
further towards Iran, the Iranian president Akhbar Hashemi Rasfanjani 
mobilized two divisions along the border with Azerbaijan. The United 
Nations enacted a fourth plea for calm, Resolution 884, in November 
1993 _35 
By the end of 1993, the Karabakh Armenians had created two land 
bridges to Armenia, secured a twenty kilometer-wide buffer zone around 
Nagorno-Karabakh, and captured 20% of Azerbaijan's territory. 
Throughout January and February of 1994, the Azeris, having launched a 
desperate offensive, regained some of their lost territory with the help of 
35 Ibid., 95. 
72 
thousands of foreign mercenaries from Afghanistan and advisors from 
Turkey. With this escalation, both parties finally agreed upon a Russian-
sponsored plan to end the fighting in May of 1994. Soon after, the long 
and difficult negotiations for a peaceful and permanent settlement of the 
issues surrounding the sovereignty of Nagorno-Karabakh began in 
earnest.36 As of this writing, a mutual agreement has still not been 
reached and sporadic fighting, mostly along the border, occurred as 
recently as April 1997.37 
In the latest OSCE-led negotiations, Azerbaijan has sought to 
maintain the pre-conflict status quo of Nagorno-Karabakh offering 
autonomy and security guarantees to the Armenians, but only once ethnic 
Armenian forces relinquish control of any and all territory they still hold 
in both Nagorno-Karabakh and in Azerbaijan proper. The Azerbaijanis 
explicitly rule out independence and still refuse to recognize the 
Karabakh Armenians as an equal negotiating partner.38 Meanwhile, the 
complexities of "pipeline politics" continue to inspire external players to 
meddle in the negotiating process. Consequently, Turkey, Russia, the 
United States, Iran, and others continue to complicate resolution of most 
issues relating to the future of Nagorno-Karabakh. 
36 Ibid., 97. 
37 Ibid., 121. 
38 Ibid., 132. 
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D. CONCLUSIONS 
International pipeline politics and the security concerns of 
bordering states notwithstanding, the fundamental Armenian-Azerbaijani 
struggle remains the same: sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh. To be 
fully successful in grasping the true fault line in this conflict, one must 
understand the profound meaning that this sovereignty holds for both 
sides. For the Azeris, the territory itself somehow replaces a sense of 
national identity stifled by its former rulers. For the Armenians the 
territory symbolizes their fragile uniqueness in a region surrounded by 
peoples very unlike themselves. 
Although the conflict was fraught with meddling by tertiary players, 
it was not a civilizational clash by any stretch. The two sides fought to 
maintain what both believed to be the status quo in reference to their 
respective national identities. Apart from the logistical and tactical 
necessity of acquiring the external support which is necessary for 
emerging nations to prosecute a war, it was apparent that they never 
desired to attach a wider civilizational meaning to their struggle. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Since the end of the relatively simple bi-polar world and its 
s.ubsequent replacement by a fragmented and convoluted "new world 
order", it seems comforting, at least to some, to be able to still classify 
conflicts along familiar bi-polar lines. Professor Samuel Huntington's 
"East versus West" civilizational paradigm does exactly this. Huntington 
sees a world in which the forces of Islam are defiantly and dangerously 
arrayed against the Western secular world, with the green menace of 
Radical Islamic Fundamentalism conveniently replacing the "Red Menace" 
of communism. Although Islamic forces are often named as "usual 
suspects" in many of the past decade's conflicts, we have seen that in 
three with a strong Islamic flavor, important distinctions must be made 
among them. It is clear that a blanket explanatory hypothesis, such as the 
one proposed by the civilizational paradigm, IS insufficient for 
determining policy and action in the face of these sorts of conflict. 
Tajikistan's civil war, although heralded by some as a dangerous 
harbinger of a much feared regional Islamic takeover, was not that at all. 
In fact, the war resulted from competition between regional clans, not 
radical Islamic activism. The common Tajik attitude towards Islam, not 
as a radical, all-encompassing obsession, but rather as a pragmatic system 
of values and traditions, steered the opposition forces away from a desire 
75 
to establish an Islamic state and led them along a more rational path, one 
in which church and state would still be separated. 
Analysis of the violent episodes in Central Asia's Ferghana Valley 
that pitted Muslim against Muslim clearly demonstrates that, although 
Islamic factors were manipulated by political entrepreneurs to further 
divide and mobilize ethnic groups, the conflict was really over scarce 
resources and perceptions of injustices drawn along ethnic and regional 
lines. Islamic factors in the episodic violence in that region have been 
tangential, not causal. 
Not even the bloody ethnic conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, a war 
which pitted Muslim against Christian, can be conceived as a clash of 
East versus West, unless one analyzes it at levels far removed from the 
actual fighting, and considers third party participants like Russia, Iran, 
and Turkey jockeying for increased influence in the area. At ground 
level, in contrast, the conflict was purely a struggle to maintain national 
identity, with both sides committed to an absolute sovereignty over 
disputed territory. 
For soldiers, diplomats, and members of non-governmental 
organizations, who will assuredly perform preventative, interventionary or 
post-conflict engagement roles in these or other similar regions, it is vital 
to recognize the true sources of conflict and understand the power 
networks that really matter at the local level. All too often, pre-
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deployment briefings and published area studies lack sufficient detail at 
this vitally important level. These broad-stroke compilations only offer 
historical and situational assessments in national or, worse, international 
terms, and at what Professor Huntington refers to as the secondary and 
tertiary levels. Hence, they omit important facts about the primary or 
local level, where the actual fighting occurs. It is at this basic level 
where both military and civilian operators will most often execute 
missions to support regional security and stability. 
Thus, there are certain additional imperatives for understanding that 
operators must pay attention to in order to successfully carry out their 
missions. 
First, operators must possess a basic knowledge of the historical 
grievances that moved identity groups into a position to either self-
mobilize or be mobilized by their leaders, or others, to fight. 
Second, they should understand to whom or to what the various 
groups owe allegiance politically, militarily, economically and, equally 
importantly, spiritually. Very often the true power networks are not the 
formal systems set up by governments or opposition groups, they are 
informal patron-client networks based on regional clans, local shadow 
organizations, economic cooperatives, and even extended families. 
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Third, operators should be cognizant of how the people or 
organizations owed local allegiance actually make decisions and facilitate 
actions that affect the politics and the population on the ground. 
Fourth, when it comes to violence, operators need to be able to 
gauge the role religion plays. Religion's role in conflicts can vary 
greatly. We have explored it in this thesis primarily as a tool by which 
leaders can broaden their base of support and mobilize larger segments of 
a constituency to action. Leaders in Eurasia have used religion to 
highlight the differences between identity groups, deepening existing 
fissures between groups. This also serves to raise the collective 
consciousness of an identity group, making members more likely to fight 
to defend their group's ideals. Conversely, religion can also serve as a 
stabilizing factor, instilling and reinforcing a positive system of beliefs 
and values that potentially benefit a society struggling to overcome the 
extreme difficulties that continue to plague the majority of the new 
Eurasian republics. This shall not be forgotten. 
As a consequence, operators must be able to distinguish between 
those religious factors that actually produce friction and those that merely 
give the appearance of doing so. 
I highlight this last point m particular because the current Uzbek 
regime, to its peril, appears to be making this exact mistake. The 
regime's response to isolated attacks by Wahabbi terrorists has resulted in 
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a campaign of dogmatic repression of everyday Islamic traditions and 
practices that may, in the near future, cause normally pragmatic Islamic 
adherents to radicalize, sending Uzbekistan and most likely the rest of 
Central Asia into turmoil. 
Islam is, without question, a powerful force in Eurasia, and 
throughout much of the world. Muslims in the Caucasus and Central Asia 
will continue to pursue their Muslim traditions as they construct their 
national identities. Adherence to Islam, with its inherently good system 
of values and unifying traditions, may actually help bring stability and 
calm to these new and still very volatile republics. The myopic viewpoint 
that everything Islamic must be suppressed as violent and radical in 
nature is clearly obstructive to the "West's" stated goals of supporting 
democratic ideals and economic prosperity across the region. Only by 
truly understanding the full range of extant fissures, and the complex 
nature of differences on the ground, at the grass roots level, will it be 
possible to understand the uses, misuses, and abuses that might be made 
of Islam or any other religion for that matter. 
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